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1. Geographical Position 
The Grand Duchy is a unitary state with a territory of 2,586 km2 and a population of just 
about 500,000 nowadays which made it the smallest member state of the EU on both accounts 
until Cyprus joined the Union. It is a landlocked country bordered by Belgium to its (north-) 
west, Germany to its (north-)east and France to its south. Together with the area around the 
capital city of Luxembourg, the southern part of the country is heavily and densely populated 
around the second largest city (Esch-sur-Alzette), whilst the north (and the east) of the Grand 
Duchy is made of rural, lightly populated areas.  What is remarkable in Luxembourg, 
compared to the other EU countries, is that the resident foreigner population increased from 
17.1% in 1981 to more than 43% in 2009.1 This important growth of the foreigner population 
raises an increasingly salient problem of democratic legitimacy which most visible aspects are 
the limited participation of foreigners to the national public space and to the local and EU 
elections (see infra).   
 
2. Historical Background 
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was created by the Great Powers at Vienna in 1815 as a 
state distinct from the Kingdom of Netherlands—but in personal union with the Dutch 
crown—and as a member of the German confederation, after having been a French 
department from 1795, and having shared Belgium’s institutional fate for several centuries. 
Between 1830 and 1839, after the Belgian revolution, the Grand Duchy, with the exception of 
Luxembourg City,2 was integrated into the new Kingdom of Belgium. Luxembourg became 
independent from Belgium in 1839 but lost 60 per cent of its territory and almost half of its 
population (the French-speaking section) to its neighbour at the Treaty of London. With 
Dutch King William II as Grand Duke, Luxembourg then became a unified constitutional 
parliamentary monarchy under its first liberal constitution in 1848, of which three-quarters of 
the articles are identical to, or very slightly adapted from, those of the 1831 Belgian 
Constitution (Poirier 2008: 134). Political Full independence will be obtained after the demise 
of the German confederation through the conference of London in 1867, which made 
Luxembourg a neutral state guaranteed by the great powers, and further in 1890 with the end 
of the personal union with the Dutch crown and the ascent of a new dynasty (Nassau) to the 
throne. The First World War threatened Luxembourg’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 
not only through the German invasion but also in the immediate post-war years due to the 
accommodative behaviour of the authorities during the occupation, which led the allied 
powers to decide on the fate of the country. In 1921, Luxembourg signed a customs and 
monetary union with Belgium despite a referendum that showed that the population preferred 
an economic union with France. The aftermath of the Second World War was much less 
problematic for Luxembourg on the international scene, as the legal government had fought 
the war from London with the allies, but the Nazi occupation itself caused deeper wounds as 
the invader considered the Grand Duchy as part of the Reich, administered by a Gauleiter, 
forcing young Luxembourgers to conscription into the German army.  
     
3. Geopolitical Profile 
Mainly due to its size and its dependency on foreign markets, Luxembourg has traditionally 
favoured participation and loyalty to larger political and economic settings, and was therefore 
a founding member of all the major international organizations that promote economic, 
military 3 and political integration including European Union, NATO, OECD, the United 
Nations and Benelux. Its sheer size as compared to its powerful French and German 
neighbours also largely accounts for the decision of the founding members of the European 
Coal and Steel Community to establish their executive, the High Authority, in Luxembourg, 
and later for the seating of Euratom, the European Court of Justice, European Investment 
Bank and European Court of Auditors in Luxembourg. Together with the general secretariat 
of the EP, several services of the Commission and the publications office of the EU, these 
institutions make for the presence of about 10,000 European civil servants in Luxembourg. 
Never considered as a threat by the larger member states, Luxembourg has also been 
disproportionally advantaged regarding the appointment of its nationals to high European 
office. The further positive aspects of EU membership in terms of political weight, for 
instance through the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, or the seat in the EU 
Commission, and economic development, through the early presence of EU institutions in the 
capital city, largely explain why the Grand Duchy’s population and political elite strongly 
support EU integration.  
 
4. Overview of the Political Landscape  
 
Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democratic regime. Under the 
present constitution, both the Chamber of Deputies and the monarch, represented in practice 
by the government, have the right to initiate legislation whilst parliamentary assent is required 
to pass bills. Until 2009 the Grand Duke, as part of the legislative branch?, approved  (with 
the counter-signature of a cabinet minister) and, as part of the executive branch, promulgated 
all bills. A revision of article 34 of the Constitution withdrew the Grand Duke’s prerogative to 
approve (sanctionner) legislation, following his refusal to approve the law on euthanasia 
voted on by parliament. Other bodies intervene in the legislative process, like the Council of 
State,4 designed in 1856 as the legal advisor to the government. The latter must issue an 
opinion on each bill or amendment before a final vote is taken in the Chamber, and, since 
1868, it may use its right to ask for a second ‘constitutional’ vote at least three months after 
the first parliamentary vote (potential right of veto of suspension). This disposition was 
introduced as a proxy for a second legislative chamber—which was felt inappropriate for a 
small country—as it provided for a period of reflection amongst deputies and a wider national 
debate among the population, before a legislative decision was eventually formally taken. 
Also, since 1924 the elected professional chambers have to issue a non-binding opinion 
before the Chamber of Deputies can hold a final vote on bills relating to particular 
professional interests, including appropriations in the national budget. Finally, a 1977 
government bill created the ‘Tripartite committee’ for crisis management. It issues advice 
when some unemployment thresholds are reached. Not only is this process compulsory, but in 
practice its recommendations are also binding. The Chamber of Deputies does not take part in 
this interchange between labour (employers and workers) and government representatives. 
This neo-corporatist device is of utmost importance in wages and other aspects of social 
policy and therefore highly respected in Luxembourg (Hirsch 1986). The failure to reach 
agreements in the most recent meetings however raised some doubts about its efficiency in 
times of crisis of an increasingly globalized economy (Clément 2011). Note that several 
institutions controlling or supplementing the activity of elected politicians were also recently 
created: a Constitutional Court in 1996, a Court of Auditors in 1999, and the office of the 
Ombudsman in 2004.  
 
 
5. Brief Account of the Political Parties   
The Christian Democrats (CSV- Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei), member of the European 
People’s Party, dominate the Grand Duchy’s political landscape since the end of World War I, 
having been out and therefore not leading national cabinets being only for the 1925-1926 and 
1974-1979 periods . Founded as the Parti de la Droite/Partei der Rechten in 1914, and 
backed by a well-structured catholic world organized at the turn of the century in order to 
balance the power of the liberal political elites of the newly independent state, it adopted its 
present name in December 1944. Originally drawing most of its electorate from rural areas it 
soon generalized its appeal to the working class through the development of a catholic trade 
union. Originating from the liberal-conservative cleavage, but inspired by the social catholic 
doctrine, the party increasingly put emphasis on the socio-economic divide on which it takes a 
central position,5 while keeping rather conservative views of the society that guaranteed the 
support of its traditional rural and Christian clientele.6 The party relies on its traditional 
‘pillar’ organisations, a powerful base of local elites covering the whole territory, and an 
important presence in all layers of the national civil service allowed by its almost continuous 
leadership of the cabinets. Overall it claims about 10,000 members.   
    
The two other main parties of the Luxembourgish landscape are the socialist party LSAP 
(Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei – founded in 1902 as the Social Democratic 
Party, renamed in 1924 as Workers’ Party to reflect its role as political branch of the workers’ 
movement- adopted its present name after World War II), member of the European Socialist 
Party which as second largest party at the national level has most often been the junior party 
of the CSV in government, and the liberal, DP (Demokratesch Partei - founded in 1904 as the 
Liberal League and adopting its present name in 1955), member of Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe. The socialist party had to live through on the one hand the 1921 
breakaway of members forming the Communist Party on its left and on the other hand the 
formation in the early 1970s of a splinter party (Social Democratic Party) on its right 
contesting the choice of coalescing with the communists at the local level. The socialists 
entered government in 1937 and contributed with the CSV to the establishment of a strong 
welfare system, and from 1974 to 1979 when they governed with the DP they initiated several 
liberal legislations (for instance on abortion). The LSAP’s electoral strongholds are situated in 
the highly populated and historically industrial southern constituency bordering France, but 
the party is also usually the most powerful party overall at the local level. 7 Even though 
formal links with the powerful socialist trade union have decreased in the latest decades, 
effective collaboration nevertheless remain visible for a political organization that keeps 
characteristics of a mass party, relying nowadays on about 6,000 members. Liberals, on the 
other hand, used to dominate parliamentary politics as long as universal suffrage was not 
implemented, defending a liberal state rather than the maintenance of Catholic Church 
prerogatives, and modernization through industrialization rather than rural and agricultural 
interests. Successive and sometimes parallel movements and parties organized the liberal 
camp around notabilities, and the present DP still bears some resemblance to the original 
cadre party it built on, being for instance the political force for which voters cast most 
preferential votes. Although it has for long balanced between social liberal and more 
conservative factions, it has generally favoured minimal state intervention in the economy and 
taken liberal views of society. The DP has generally been the third largest party of the country 
but also the leading one in the capital city of Luxembourg in the most recent decades, and 
improved its membership rate since the 2011 local elections and the emergence of new 
popular figures such as the new mayor of Luxembourg City (it now claims about 6,000 
members).   
Much like their sister parties in the neighbouring countries, the Greens in Luxembourg 
emerged from new social movements and have established themselves as a relevant actor in 
the national political landscape, becoming the fourth largest party of the country. The first 
Green party organization was founded in 1983 but competition between purely 
environmentalist and new left tendencies (as well as personal ambitions) led to the creation of 
separate parties until the 1990s. Since the 2000s, déi Gréng, member of the European Green 
Party, have positioned themselves as centrist on the socio-economic, libertarian on social 
issues but have not yet managed to enter national government. The ADR (created in 1987 as 
the Five-Sixths Action Committee; its present name is Alternativ Demokratesch 
Reformpartei), member of the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists is another 
party that was initially focused on a single issue (a universal entitlement to pensions worth 
five-sixths of final salary, as was the case for the public sector) but this time on the 
conservative right of the political spectrum. It is led by notables adopting anti-consociational 
democracy, anti-corruption discourse and finds its support mainly in the rural north but also 
among craftsmen, small businessmen and qualified workers in the south. Those two parties 
managed to get about 10% of the votes in national elections in the two most recent decades, 
whilst their membership numbers range between less than 1,000 and 2,000.   
Finally, there are two radical left parties. The first one is the communist KPL (Kommunistesch 
Partei Lëtzebuerg - founded in 1921, no affiliation at the European level see also above), 
which took part of the first post-war national unity coalition cabinet in 1945. Its peak of 
electoral support, mainly due to its stronghold of the southern, industrial constituency, dates 
back to the late 1960s. The party remained aligned to the Soviet power throughout the Cold 
War rather than engage in Eurocommunism and did not change much of its stances since the 
collapse of the Iron Curtain either, resulting in the loss of its ultimate MP in 1994. This 
ideological rigidity led some members to found the Néi Lénk movement which became the 
Left party (déi Lénk, member of the European Left Party in the 1990s, in order to constitute a 
‘new left’, modern alternative to the KPL, including former socialists, greens, trotskyists  and 
trade unionists.8 Each of these radical left parties has a few hundred members.  
 
5.1. Parties’ attitude towards the European Union  
 
The main parties of the countries were strong supporters of EU integration from the beginning 
of the European construction. The Christian Democrats (CSV) were, together with their 
counterparts in the founding member states, crucial in the setting up of European integration 
and are still nowadays strong defenders of the Community method. Even though their attitude 
towards European integration is genuinely enthusiastic, the subtle discourse of their party 
leaders who have been also almost permanently responsible for defending the country’s 
national interests can sometimes take a somewhat sovereignist tone (see infra). The CSV 
provided the Community with prominent figures of the European construction such as Pierre 
Werner, who was decisive to solve the empty chair crisis of 1965 and who drafted the 
blueprint for an economic and monetary union , the “Werner Plan”, Jacques Santer, who was 
the president of the European commission from 1995 to 1999, and the current Prime Minister, 
Jean Claude Juncker, who is president of the Euro group since the creation of a semi-
permanent position in 2005.  
Although the socialist party LSAP and the liberal DP (whose historical leader, Gaston Thorn, 
was president of the European Commission from 1981 to 1985) both have at times shown 
signs of less euro-optimism (in particular, intra-party cohesion on the topic appears less 
guaranteed than in the CSV), these parties are in favour of European integration, be it for 
quite different reasons and for diverse goals (see infra). The Greens, starting with a less 
enthusiastic view of European integration, have increasingly come to support it. Overall then, 
between the only four main parties that managed to ever obtain seats in the European 
parliament, there is no real cleavage, and certainly no polarisation (the range of positions 
probably even shrunk through time) at the party political level on European issues. The others 
parties can be defined as euro sceptical but only represent a marginal electoral weight. On the 
one hand, the sovereignist conservative party ADR, and on the other, the radical left parties 
KPL and déi Lénk, have distinctive critiques on European integration and varying degrees of 
opposition to the way this process is taking place (see infra), but only the Communists plead 
for the dissolution of the European Union and the creation of a new one by a European 
constitutional assembly. 
 
6. Public Opinion and the European Union 
 
According to the Autumn 2009 Eurobarometer (EB, 72), Luxembourg’s public opinion comes 
first among that of all member states in considering that the country’s belonging to EU is a 
positive thing (74 percent - EU average: 53 percent) and in believing that their national 
interests are well taken care of by the EU (65 percent  - EU average: 39 percent). Also in 
terms of subjective knowledge does Luxembourg outstand all other member states, since a 
large majority of its population claims to be well aware of the functioning of the European 
Union (63 percent - EU average: 44 percent). Luxembourgish residents are also far more 
numerous than the EU average to trust the European Parliament, the European Commission , 
to be satisfied with the level of democracy in Europe (75 percent - EU average: 54 percent) 
and to consider that the common currency (Euro) is a good thing (80 percent - EU average: 60 
percent). The only aspect for which the Luxembourg’s population is clearly more critical than 
the EU average concerns the Union’s enlargement: 74 percent consider that the EU expanded 
too rapidly (EU average: 61 percent) and only 39 percent are in favor of including new 
countries in the EU (EU average: 46 percent), putting the country amongst the most reluctant 
member states on the issue.   
This has generally been the picture of Luxembourg’s public opinion, assumed to be extremely 
pro-EU integration, although nuances gradually appeared in the recent decades. The 
implementation of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty is a case in point. The right of all EU citizens 
to participate in local elections in Luxembourg violated articles 52 and 107 of the 
Constitution, and the national constitutional revision process prevented an amendment 
without the dissolution of parliament and new elections (because these articles had not been 
included in the June 1989 declaration of revision). The government found a technical solution 
to avoid an electoral campaign that would inevitably have been fought on the issue of these 
voting rights for foreign citizens. Luxembourg was, as a consequence, one of the first 
countries to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, which was adopted on 27th July 1992 by a large 
majority in parliament including its unconstitutional provisions after the three traditional 
parties agreed that the relevant articles would be declared open for revision in 1994. This 
episode marked one of the first breaches in the general political consensus shared by the 
political class, the social forces of the country and its population on EU integration. Experts 
denounced the government’s actions in the press and associations were created to defend and 
promote respect for the Constitution. Apart from the claim to respect the latter, the question of 
European citizenship and the right for EU residents to vote in local elections were divisive in 
the population, as some saw these as potential threats for the national sovereignty and identity 
in a country where, at the time, about 30% (above 40% nowadays) of the residents were 
foreigners. 9  
The 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty was however the first evidence of the 
existence of a major gap between the political elites and citizens on the issue of EU 
integration in Luxembourg. Comparative analyses on data from the 2004 European Election 
Study had already showed that the Grand Duchy fared amongst the member states in which 
the distance between citizens and parties on EU integration was the greatest, with the former 
considering the latter to be ‘too’ EU supportive (Mattila and Raunio 2006: 438).10 In 2005, 
whilst political elites were expecting a massive support in favor of the treaty, only 56.5 
percent of the voting population favored the adoption of the text. The lack of congruence 
between citizens and their representatives was blatant, as the proportion of MPs belonging to 
parties that campaigned against the adoption of the Treaty in 2005 was only 8.3 percent, to be 
compared with 43.5 percent of ‘No’ votes. 11 Unlike in France and in the Netherlands, the key 
element determining the ‘No’ vote was not the voters’ opinion about the socio-economic 
situation of the country (which here came second) but rather the voters’ opinion on the 
European Constitutional Treaty itself. The question of national identity and Turkey’s 
candidature at the European union also ranked high in the ‘No’ voters’ motivations. On the 
other hand most of the ‘Yes’ voters argued that they above all voted according to their 
opinion on the EU in general (Dumont et al. 2007). Despite the highest prohead GDP and a 
low level of unemployment, slightly above 4 percent, the economic situation was perceived at 
the time as bad by almost one third of Luxembourgers as the rate of unemployment literally 
doubled in the preceding four years. Due to threats of delocalization of large companies, to 
fears of employment losses in the powerful banking sector and in the civil service sector in 
the event of tax harmonization, or to decisions regarding the opening of all public sector jobs 
to non-nationals made at the European level, Luxembourgers became amongst the most 
pessimistic Europeans about the evolution of unemployment. Luxembourg’s population also 
became more concerned about the arrival of refugees that started in the 1990s with the Balkan 
crisis and illegal immigration. A correlation was made in the minds of many inhabitants 
between these phenomena and increased criminality, with the European Union as the ultimate 
authority responsible for these problems. During the campaign, the ‘No’ side gained 
momentum, fuelled by the very effective ‘No’ campaigns in France and the Netherlands, but 
the eventual level of the ‘No’ vote was also due to the mobilization of a ‘Committee for the 
No’ formed as early as July 2004 by several civil society associations and the extreme left 
party (déi Lénk). The jury is still out on the question of what would have happened without 
the strong personal involvement of the popular Prime minister at the end of campaign: as 
some famous historical figures before him, Jean-Claude Juncker went as far as declaring that 
he would resign from his position in case of victory of the No.12  
 
7. National and EP Electoral Systems  
 
Luxembourg citizens aged between 18 and 75 (the upper limit was revised in 2003 and 
extended from 70 to 75) are obliged to vote for the election of the sixty deputies13 for a five-
year term. Proportional representation is based on four electoral constituencies: the South 
elects twenty-three deputies, the Centre twenty-one, the North nine and the East seven. In 
each of the constituencies the voter has the same number of votes as there are seats to be filled 
and may cast them for a single party list (list vote) or may vote for candidates of one or more 
than one party (the latter possibility is referred to as inter-party panachage).  
 
Since the 2004 national elections, at least half of the citizens express a preferential vote for 
candidates of one or several lists rather than a list vote (Dumont et al. 2006; 2011). This result 
was confirmed in the 2009 elections when no less than 52.8 percent of citizens expressed such 
a vote, with a two-percent increase compared to 2004. This proportion is only somewhat 
lower for the EP elections, 48.8 percent, and the gap has shrunk in 2009 since the proportion 
of citizens choosing to vote for candidates instead of expressing a list vote increased more (+4 
percent) than that of the national elections.  In addition, for both types of elections the 
proportion of votes given through inter-party panachage has doubled in thirty years: in 2009 
four out of ten voters (36.5 percent for the European elections) expressed a preferential vote 
for candidates of different parties, confirming that voters increasingly seize the opportunity 
that the electoral system gives to vote on personalities rather than parties and their 
ideologies.14  
 
Luxembourg’s proportional electoral system has led to the constant need to form coalitions 
(except for the 1921–5 period) in order for governments to have a majority in parliament. This 
need and the proximity between voters and their representatives in a small society has 
constrained political competition, with parties aggregating the social demands of their 
electoral clientele but refraining from claiming radical policy changes in order to remain 
‘coalitionable’ (Dumont and De Winter 2000), making the Grand Ducal political system as a 
whole – we already saw the neo-corporatist character of its legislative process – approximate 
that of an ideal-typical consensus democracy. The results of the last national elections that 
took place in June 2009 however confirmed that one actor, the pivotal Christian-social party 
(CSV), dominates the government formation process in this consensus democracy, since its 
bargaining power was further increased (it gained two more seats and now relies comfortably 
on 43.3 percent of seats in parliament), allowing it to choose its coalition partner as it did 
continuously since 1979, here the incumbent junior party LSAP (socialist party) that lost one 
seat at the elections (Dumont et al. 2010: 1076).15  
 
Ever since 1979, elections to the European Parliament are fought on the same day as the 
national ones. Contrary to the latter, there is only a single constituency that elects the six 
Luxembourgish MEPs. Up until 2004, party lists consisted of 12 candidates. This led to the 
practice of putting party heavyweights on both the national list where they could fight the 
elections in their own constituency and the European list where they could attract votes from 
all over the country, as the possibility of inter-party panachage further rewards popular 
candidates with a country-wide visibility. As government formation negotiations at the 
national level usually start before the first meeting of the EP, those heavyweights had the time 
to choose between the two mandates they had received from voters, and if their party made it 
to government they resigned from their EP seat to be appointed as cabinet ministers. As a 
result, MEPs from the Luxembourg delegation were in majority non-elected, lower profile 
figures (this was for instance the case for all three CSV MEPs in the preceding EP term). The 
2008 reform (see Dumont et al. 2009: 1038) reduced from twelve to six the number of 
candidates running for the European elections to encourage parties to present candidates 
actually committed to taking up their seats in Strasbourg and Brussels by effectively making 
the safety net of substitutes smaller. Legislation forbidding double candidatures (in 2004, 58 
of the 60 EP candidates of the five larger parties fought both national and European elections) 
would have been a potential alternative, but Luxembourg parties preferred to keep this 
possibility open. The four parties with representation in the EP nevertheless arrived at a 
consensus on this issue in the second part of 2008. Only the smaller parties did not commit 
themselves to presenting separate lists due to their lack of popular figures. Note also that a 
majority of candidates on EP lists have to be of Luxembourgish nationality. On the other hand 
there is no legally specified quota for gender.  
The 2008 reform also allowed voters to cast up to two personal votes for the same candidate, 
a possibility that already existed for the national elections.16 This evolution towards the same 
system as the one used for the national elections (no substitutes on the list and the possibility 
to cast two votes for a single candidate) made the European contest more competitive than in 
the system previously in force for the EP elections. 
Finally, let us recall that voting is compulsory in Luxembourg for all kinds of elections. In the 
case of the EP elections, this obligation therefore extends to EU residents who have registered 
(it is automatic for all 18+ Luxembourg nationals).17 The time gap between the registration of 
EU citizens for EP elections and the date of these elections has been reduced (from almost a 
year to roughly three months) by the December 2008 reform of the electoral law. The 
requirement of duration of residence of those EU residents to be allowed to vote for these 
elections has also been reduced (from five to two). As a result, the proportion of registered 
foreign voters almost quadrupled in four elections and in 2009 accounted for 11.5 percent of 
the electorate. 
 
8. A Glance at the EP and National Elections 
 
 
Ever since 1958, regardless of the change from indirect to direct elections as well as of 
successive enlargements and corresponding increases in size of the assembly, the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg sends six MEPs to the European Parliament. The CSV has always 
been the strongest European party of the country, usually delivering three of the six 
Luxembourguish MEPs (except for the 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 terms in which they only 
returned two MEPs). Up until 1994 the other EP seats were divided up between Socialists and 
Liberals, but since then the Greens managed to secure one seat as well. On the other hand, 
none of the smaller and less EU-enthusiastic parties ever reached representation in the EP.    
The first direct elections to the EP took place in a specific context, both by European and 
Luxembourguish standards. Compared to other member states, the Grand Duchy was the only 
country in which these elections were held at the same time as the national ones. Compared to 
other EP elections in Luxembourg, 1979 was peculiar as the term had seen the Christian 
Democrats excluded from office for the first time since 1926.  The incumbent coalition had 
sought to modernize the country’s legislation on ethical issues (abortion, divorce, etc.) and 
introduced the ‘tripartite’ mechanism of dialogue with social partners to deal with an iron and 
steel industry severely hit by crisis and in need of re-structuring. Eight lists competed for the 
EP election, three of them being of negligible importance, being mostly splinter groups from 
the radical (and embryos of ecological) left and the Liberals, carrying varied stances against 
capitalist or anti-democratic Europe as well as against the privileges of ‘Eurocrats’. Three 
other lists (among which a dissident socialist one) that proved a bit more successful in the 
concurrent national elections did not present candidates for the EP electoral competition, 
enhancing differences in party results across elections. This was especially the case of the 
Liberals, benefitting from a highly personalized combat between their leader, incumbent 
Prime Minister Thorn and the one of the CSV, his predecessor Werner, in the EP election. 
These two figures both had the nation-wide notoriety needed for the ‘beauty contest’ of the 
single constituency in use for these elections and successfully overshadowed socialist 
candidates. Thorn and Werner also had a recognized European stature, the former being the 
first president of the ‘European Liberal Democrats’ federation,18 and the latter having been 
the drafter of an important report on an economic and monetary union, a characteristic that 
was hammered out by their party campaigns and at the occasion of meetings of their European 
parties in Luxembourg. The socialists attempted to bring a more regional dimension to the EP 
campaign by contributing to a common manifesto with socialist parties of the neighbouring 
German and French regions outlining the common economic problems of these industrial 
areas in crisis, but this gave the impression that this party only cared about its stronghold of 
the south of the country (Hirsch 1985: 146).19 The only relevant anti-european party in 
competition, the KPL, also brought the issue of the dismantling of industry in the 
transnational region, together with German and French comrades, to the heart of its 
campaign.20 According to this party, the hegemony of Germany, under the influence of the 
US, in the conduct of European affairs threatened Luxembourg’s sovereignty through the re-
structuring of the industrial backbone of the country’s economy and employment.  
The main issue of the 1984 EP (and national) electoral campaign was again the fate of the 
steel industry, with the (re-united) socialist party now in the opposition blaming, together with 
the Communists, the cuts in production that the quotas established by the Davignon plan of 
the European Commission demanded, as well as the consequences of the unilateral decision 
of the Belgian government in 1982 to devaluate the Belgian and Luxembourgish franc. The 
other European-related questions that touched on Luxembourg interests were that of the 
European Parliament’s seat,21 in which the Grand Duchy felt deprived by the decision to hold 
meetings in Brussels and Strasbourg but eventually retained the EP’s General Secretariat and 
limited transfers of staff to the other seats, and the foreseen enlargement of the EC. The latter 
was due to the fact that Portugal, which already represented about half of the foreigners living 
in the Luxembourg, was about to become a member state, thereby potentially involving 
further massive immigration under the context of free movement of labour. There were again 
some European or transnational party campaign activities organized, but as in 1979 the 
campaign was foremost national for both the parties and the media. Results for the EP 
election largely mirrored those of the Chamber of Deputies, with the LSAP winning an 
additional seat at the expense of the DP. All outgoing MEPs sought re-election, and three of 
them took back their seat but only one did so due to his electoral success (the other two being 
substitutes for elected MEPs who resigned when they were appointed as national ministers).    
The three large parties lost heavily at the 1989 national election, due to the electoral 
breakthrough of the Green lists and the direct success of the ADR who ran for the first time 
and only for the election of the Chamber of Deputies. This absence at the EP contest enabled 
the CSV, contrary to the LSAP and DP, to maintain their electoral result of 1984. The three 
parties kept their EP seats despite the aggregate gains of the Greens who ran on separate 
tickets. The failure of the Liberals to benefit from their opposition status was largely due to a 
lack of cohesion ever since their leader Thorn left to head the European Commission. The DP 
adopted therefore a more radical tone during the next term, for instance by taking neo-liberal 
stances on the economy and taking much less euro-enthusiast positions than usual during the 
debates around the ratification of Maastricht Treaty, due to the latter’s provisions on political 
rights and European citizenship. The Liberals called for a referendum or at least a 
constitutional revision in order to implement the Treaty in the Grand Duchy, before 
eventually deciding to rally their president vote in favour of the ratification in parliament. 
Next to a profoundly divided DP, the debates over the Maastricht Treaty saw the opposition 
of the ADR surfing on the potential threats for the national sovereignty and identity of the 
voting rights awarded to EU residents, but also Greens and Communist MPs voting no 
because of its lack in social and environmental measures. The opening of the EP competition 
to European residents and a reminiscence of the 1992 debates were reflected in the 
composition of the lists in 1994, as all of the main parties, except for those of the DP and the 
ADR, comprised one foreign candidate. A still divided DP claimed equality of treatment 
among member states, a preference for enlargement rather than deepening of the EU, and the 
importance of the subsidiarity principle. The other parties that opposed the Maastricht Treaty 
kept their stances, with the united Greens now criticizing its convergence criteria and the 
ADR insisting on the subsidiarity principle to safeguard Luxembourg’s sovereignty and 
identity. Smaller, extreme-right lists took over the issue of defense of national identity and 
opposition to the voting rights for foreigners.  The LSAP as junior party in government and in 
charge of the Foreign Affairs ministry defended Luxembourg’s negotiators achievements but 
nevertheless mentioned its will to safeguard Luxembourg’s sovereignty within the EU, while 
the party of the PM clearly appeared the most integrationist party of the political landscape. 
Despite only limited gains as compared to the aggregate support for the Greens lists in 1989, 
and very limited losses of the CSV, the united Gréng won the third seat of the Christian 
Democrats.   
PM Santer left the head of the coalition government (that was re-formed between the CSV 
and LSAP for the third time in a row) as soon as January 1995 to take the presidency of the 
European Commission, leaving the PMship to Jean-Claude Juncker.  The reform of the civil 
service led to the massive opposition of the latter’s trade union and a large demonstration at 
the end of the term. At stake was the question of pensions but also the access to public sector 
employment in the context of the opening of some of such jobs to competition between 
nationals and European citizens. Despite their previous neo-liberal positions on the civil 
service and the welfare system, the Liberals seized the opportunity of contesting a 
governmental reform that appeared to endanger the monopoly of public jobs for nationals 
(and therefore voters). This strategic move as defender of the national identity on this issue 
also allowed them to demarcate their position from that of the ADR which originally 
defended private sector employees and denounced the advantages of the public sector. The 
resignation of the Santer Commission provided another event close to the elections, which 
was however not as exploited as one would have expected by the opposition and the press, as 
the former PM appeared more like a victim than guilty of any kind of fraud. He even led the 
list of his party for the EP election, whereas his former vice-PM Poos who wished to end his 
national career led the socialist one.22 The Greens had to fight to gain back their seat, as their 
incumbent MEP left the party to create another. They managed to do it but left the seat to a 
candidate with poor electoral support, all more successful candidates having resigned to seat 
in the national parliament instead. The balance of forces in Luxembourg’s delegation to the 
EP did not change, but one has to mention that Viviane Reding, who took Juncker’s MEP seat 
when the latter renewed his position as PM, resigned in turn when she became member of the 
European Commission and left her seat to Astrid Lulling who had been MEP for the socialists 
in the 1960s.  
In 2004, the main political parties as usual focused their campaign on national issues such as 
economic growth and unemployment, education and transports. The outgoing government and 
in particular PM Juncker appeared to have preserved Luxembourg’s main national economic 
interest, the competitiveness of its financial centre (mainly ensured by its banking secrecy 
laws), through international arrangements. Another issue on which the PM was leading the 
game was that of the granting of double nationality, under certain conditions, to residents 
working in Luxembourg. He therefore managed to cover a large scope of opinions, ranging 
from the struggle for national interests to a liberal view on the question of nationality, 
together with a general pro-European commitment. Juncker’s party campaigned under the 
slogan “De séchere Wee” (the safe way) for both elections, putting his leader on top of the bill 
with a series of meetings called “Juncker on Tour”. His potential appointment as President of 
the European Commission, a position he declined in April 2004 after the offer made by the 
European People’s Party and a majority of the European centre-right governments, also 
pervaded the campaign, as a successor had to be sought within his party in case Juncker 
eventually chose to leave national politics. This did not materialize but Juncker’s electoral 
success on the single constituency brought his party to a level never reached at the EP 
elections (over 37%), allowing it to gain back the third seat it had deprived of for two terms 
by the socialists. The latter lost for the fourth time in a row at the European contest but 
managed to get back in power thanks to its slightly better score at the national elections. This 
change of coalition government was facilitated by the heavy defeat of the junior partner of the 
CSV, the Liberals being even bypassed in votes at the EP election by the Greens.   
 
9. The 2009 European Elections 
 
9.1. Parties’ Lists and Manifestos23 
 
Political parties from the opposition were the first to engage in the campaign for European 
elections. This was especially the case for the smaller and less euro-enthusiastic ones, 
portraying the European elections as a new referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in order to 
benefit from the support they gained at the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty 
in 2005. On the one hand, the parties of the radical left published their platforms for the 
European elections as soon as January 2008. Both parties attempted to convince the electorate 
that voting for them could contribute to punish the “ultraliberal Europe” of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the globalization of markets and the dominance of the financial sector on the economy. The 
Communists (KPL) called for a pure and simple dissolution of the EU –according to the KPL 
its institutions always served the powers of the free market– whilst déi Lénk seek to 
reestablish another one, that would be more interventionist in the economy and that would be 
more democratic (the EP would have more powers, the European Commission should be 
elected by the citizens, and referenda would be held for Treaty changes). On the other hand, in 
June 2008, the ADR announced its agreement with the British Conservatives to form a 
common group in the European Parliament with other elected officials from mostly recent 
member states. Membership in this group was considered by the party leadership both as a 
political resource in the forthcoming electoral battle in Luxembourg and as an extension of 
the campaign on the European Constitutional Treaty. The ADR opposed the devolution of 
sovereign rights to the EU, supported a Europe of the Nations and therefore welcomed the 
strengthening of the power of national parliaments. It campaigned against further 
enlargements especially to Turkey (for this party, a referendum should be organized in 
Luxembourg in case of new envisaged enlargements) and insisted on the defence of national 
identity through the promotion of the Luxembourgish language and the non-opening of civil 
service jobs to non-nationals. The party also wanted to appear as the sole champion of liberal 
sovereignism in Luxembourg in order to compete with the CSV that tends to keep balance its 
pro-Europe image with a skillfull discourse on taxation policy and the economic 
competitiveness of Luxembourg in Europe. The newcomer BiergerLëscht, created by a former 
ADR national MP, opposed the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and claimed to represent the 43 
percent of the Luxembourg’s population who voted against the European Constitutional 
Treaty. It campaigned for a more social Europe but also adopted similar views as the ADR on 
the role of the national language (to be recognized as one of the official EU languages) and 
the advent of a Europe of independent nations where small countries would keep their veto 
rights.  
The Liberals and Greens nominated their leaders and announced their priorities for European 
Union politics in Autumn 2008. They were, as usual, clearly more pro-integration than the 
smaller opposition parties, both pointing at the role of the EU in foreign policy issues, such as 
human rights and development, and déi Gréng naturally insisting on environmental policy 
(stressing the need to cooperate when fighting climate change). They nevertheless diverged 
regarding the liberalization policies of the EU which were promoted by the DP and criticized 
by the Greens for becoming ends rather than means. They broadly agreed on the inefficiency 
of European (and national) economic governance and called for a more dynamic Europe and 
the need for further European integration in environmental, migration and ethical issues. Both 
parties also called for a strict respect of European treaties, of the Community method and of 
the equal treatment for each member state.  
In January 2009, the governmental parties (CSV and LSAP) officially launched their 
campaigns for the European elections and presented their lists two months later (March, 
2009). Both parties stressed the importance of the Lisbon Treaty as an adequate response to 
the challenges of a social Europe and considered the European elections as a good opportunity 
to explain the functioning of European governance. The two parties differed in the importance 
given to the platforms of their European political parties. Although the CSV was the only one 
(with the DP) to issue a specific programme for the European elections, its campaign 
remained primarily a national one. It claimed to be the Luxemburgische Europapartei 
(Luxembourgish Party for Europe), emphasizing the competence of its leader and political 
personnel, but considered that since Europe is rooted in the heart of the country, the electoral 
campaign should reconcile and explain the interdependencies between national and European 
interests. From a socio-economic perspective, Europe is considered the best answer to the 
challenge of globalization in terms of economic stability and negotiation power on the world 
scene as well as regarding development policy. The socialist party (LSAP) was the only party 
referring explicitly to the European (Socialists) party manifesto and their principles in their 
general party programme for national and EP elections. The party called for social justice in 
Europe and the promotion by the European parliament of a real social market economy. The 
socialists therefore presented the European elections as a referendum against the majority of 
European governments dominated by the Conservatives, depicted as co-responsible actors of 
the deviancies of European capitalism. The LSAP further considered that European 
integration is not a threat to national identity and proposed enforcing European identity 
through the setting of European symbols (i.e. 9 May would be a holiday across the EU). 
Given that the socialist trade union, which remains well represented in the party’s leadership, 
remains attached to the Luxembourgish social model and therefore concerned about the 
deepening of political and economic integration, and that its voters (as well as those of the 
Greens, see Dumont et al. 2007) had split in halves at the occasion of the 2005 referendum on 
the constitutional treaty, a more Euro-sceptic tone could have been expected.  
 
Overall then, all programs –but the one of the communists– described Luxembourg’s 
membership in the EU as a necessity for the Grand Duchy, and only varied in terms of their 
evaluation of the benefits it provides or threats it represents to the country and its inhabitants, 
as well as in terms of the scope of changes to be undertaken to reform it or its policies. It is 
interesting to note that some candidates further edited a separate manifesto from their party.24 
In his personal electoral platform, Charles Goerens, the leader of the Liberal EP list adopted a 
more critical stance than the one of his party regarding the political functioning of the 
European Union. He insisted on the principle of equality between member states and rejected 
the de facto creation of a German, British and French directorate in Europe. Most parties 
denounced this ‘directorate’ as well, that for some, would endanger the community method, 
and for others, would threaten Luxembourg’s national interests. In addition Goerens was 
particularly concerned about the lack of action of the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank since the economic and financial crisis emerged in Autumn 2008.  
 
One third of all EP candidates were already on EP lists in 2004, a reproduction rate well 
below the one of the national level (46.5 percent).25 Compared to the 2004 elections, the 
proportion of candidates possessing any political mandate (local, national or European) 
strongly decreased. Overall only 35.4 percent of candidates had one while in 2004 they were 
twice as many (72.6 percent). This vertiginous decrease is largely due to the decision of the 
major parties to ban dual candidatures on both the European and national lists and to their 
strategy of positioning their most well-known candidates for the national competition and 
draft lists of new/unknown candidates pulled by a leader with recognized EU competence for 
the EP contest.26 The average age of EP candidates was 51 years, a decrease as compared with 
2004, with a particular young Green list (42) compared to that one the LSAP (57).27 Gender 
wise, there were 35.4 percent of female candidates which corresponds to the highest rate of 
female participation since the first EU elections in 1979. A similar trend is observed 
concerning the participation of foreign candidates whose presence increased steadily, from 6.8 
percent in 1994 to 8.3 percent in 1999 and 11.9 percent in 2004, to 16.7 percent (7 out of 42) 
in 2009. Four of the seven foreign candidates were Portuguese, one was Italian, one French 
and one German.28 
 
 
9.2. Electoral Campaign 29 
 
Even though the interest for the European elections and campaign is comparatively strong in 
Luxembourg, data from the 2009 post-electoral survey among national citizens show that it 
does not reach the level of the national and local elections. Whereas more than half of citizens 
believe the local elections (55.8 percent) and legislative (62.5 percent) to be ‘very important’, 
this is only the case for 30 percent of citizens in the European elections. Concerning the 
political campaign, 70.5 percent of voters were (very) interested in the legislative campaign 
while for that of the European elections they were only 51.6 percent.30 As a result, whereas 
77.5 percent of the respondents declared that they would still always participate in national 
elections if voting was not compulsory, for the European elections this proportion is only 63.7 
percent. As could be expected, the efforts of the European Parliament in its transnational 
campaign to increase the turnout for the elections went almost unnoticed in Luxembourg 
where voting is compulsory.31 
 
As ever since 1979, the campaign for the European elections was less visible in the media 
than the national one. An analysis of media reporting (Huberty 2009) showed that the four 
main national newspapers devoted about 73 percent of their election campaign reports to the 
national elections only, those covering the European elections amounted to less than 19 
percent, and the rest mixed the two. Another way of assessing the coverage of the EP 
campaign is to compare it with such media reporting in the other member states. According to 
the Piredeu research programme (www.piredeu.eu), media coverage of EU news (including 
EP election campaign) increased in 2009 in Luxembourg as it did in most member states. 
Schuck et al. (2011) report that both television newscasts and newpaper front-pages contained 
a higher proportion of EU-related items than during the campaigns of the preceding EP 
elections. In particular, comparing the proportions of newspaper front-pages dedicated to EU 
affairs as presented by de Vreese et al. (2004: 488) to the 2009 figures (Schuck et al. 2011: 
47) we see a steady increase from less than 4 percent in 1994 to almost 10 percent in 2009 
(the proportion was about 6.5 percent in 2004).32 Another noticeable evolution is the increase 
in visibility of EU actors vis-à-vis domestic actors within EU-related news, from about a 
dozen percent in 2004 (de Vreese et al. 2004: 492) to more than 40 percent in 2009 (Schuck et 
al. 2009: 48), putting in this regard Luxembourg amongst the most ‘europeanised’ countries. 
This change could partly be due to the change of the electoral system, as most candidates for 
the EP election are neither candidates for the simultaneously held national ones anymore nor 
incumbent national figures. Notice also that RTL, the Luxembourgish radio and television 
company did broadcast the results of an opinion survey revealing that Europe was clearly not 
one of the main concerns for Luxembourgish citizens, but that, as indeed in most other 
member countries, the economy was the most salient issue for the 2009 EP election.33  
  
The party campaign looked similar to that of previous EP elections, with each party 
organizing either one or a couple of meetings exclusively on European issues, even though 
candidates for the EP elections often appeared in more general meetings. There were no signs 
that the parties spent more than the 10-15 percent of the general campaign budget that they 
declared to have devoted to the EP election in 2004 (Dumont et al. 2006). Note however that 
by comparative standards candidates for the EP elections in Luxembourg spend on average 
2.5 times more money than the EU average (only Ireland comes close to Luxembourg in these 
terms, Giebler and Wüst 2011). On the other hand Luxembourg candidates appear to engage 
less time in campaigning than the EU average (25 hours for an EU average of 37 hours). The 
Elect electoral survey conducted in 2009 further shows that the campaigning instruments were 
much less effective at reaching the electorate for the EP elections than for the national ones. 
More than half of respondents (56.6 percent) declared having received election flyers, but 
parties reached less than one voter out of ten with all other modes of actions. Note however 
that Facebook was –just below flyers– the most effective way to contact voters (8.5 percent of 
respondents were contacted by an EP candidate through the social network). This relatively 
high score of Facebook is explained by the fact that more than half (54.2 percent) of the EP 
elections candidates had a profile on that internet social network.34 These results corroborate 
the findings of the Piredeu candidate survey revealing that Luxembourg candidates relied 
more on ‘post-modern’ campaign tools (involving the use of the internet) and less on ‘pre-
modern’ ones (canvassing, flyers, posters, public debates etc.) than the EU average.  
 
-Table 8.6. Usage of campaigning instruments (in  percent) JUST ABOUT HERE- 
 
The sources of information that the electors used sometimes or often for making their choice 
on the European elections were primarily the “press” (70.5 percent), which also remains the 
most influential source according to respondents, “discussions among friends and family” 
(67.2 percent) the “television” (66 percent) and the “radio” (52.6 percent), with the two latter 
coming second and third in terms of influential sources. While all these sources appear to 
have been used more often than in 2004, the “internet” (21 percent) no less than tripled its 
score. Online “Voting Advice Applications” (VAAs) – which in Luxembourg was EU-
profiler – contributed to the information on EP elections for one respondent out of ten, a 
similar proportion to those who participated to electoral meetings. These findings suggest that 
there was more interest in the electorate than for the precedent European campaign. This 
greater interest for the European elections may derive from both the 2008 electoral reform and 
an agreement of the major parties that were aimed at rendering these elections more visible 
and competitive (see infra).  
 
-Table 8.7.: Sources of information in European elections in 2004 and 2009 JUST 
ABOUT HERE- 
 
Aside from the fact that citizens, media and political parties have a stronger interest for 
national elections that take place at the same time, there are other reasons that can explain the 
lack of visibility of European issues. First, in purely terms, the lower number of European 
candidates compared to the national ones (48 versus 452) makes it for a less effective and 
noticeable individual action of candidates. Another reason is that despite the 1990s and 2005 
increases in politicization of the issue, the European dimension remains far from being a 
political cleavage opposing two camps balanced in weight in Luxembourg.  
 
The economic and financial crisis was high on the agenda throughout 2008 and clearly during 
the 2009 electoral campaign. In one year the unemployment rate rose from 5 percent in 
December 2008 to 6.3 percent in December 2009, a level the country had never reached in the 
last decades. The massive increase of the unemployment of the young, the decline of the 
hiring in the financial sectors, the strong decrease of the agricultural economy (minus 25 
percent of its income for 2009 according to Eurostat) as well as the decline of temporary work 
offer are all elements that confirm the severe character of the crisis. For the national elections 
all political parties were able to position themselves on these crisis issues, from the need to 
diversify Luxembourg’s economy rather than concentrating on the financial sector (CSV), a 
greater role of the State in the economy (LSAP and radical left parties), a criticism of the 
international financial system in a global economy (DP), the need for cuts in areas of the 
public sector that are perceived not to perform well (ADR) etc. In addition to the social crisis, 
several events influenced, at least indirectly, the EU electoral campaign. 
 
In April Luxembourg was placed by the OECD in the list (the ‘grey list’) of the countries that 
do not respect the international standards against fiscal evasion and money laundry. This was 
a particularly sensitive issue not only because it could lead to a further weakening of the 
financial sector that represents 34 percent of the state revenue35 but also because it could 
provoke the weakening of Luxembourg at the European level, particularly during the 
negotiations on the economic governance of the European Union. This event led to an 
important debate in the country opposing on the one hand, those supporting a strong 
protection of the national economic interests and the privacy over personal financial data 
(such as banking secrecy), and, on the other, those who promoting a greater moralization of 
the financial system. Critics of the German and French governments characterizing 
Luxembourg as a ‘tax haven’ to be eliminated in the fight against the global crisis were in any 
case badly received by both the political elite and the population36. As a result, whether they 
were ‘federalists’ or more Euro-sceptics, Luxembourg candidates for the EP elections 
campaigned together against the growing threat of a ‘directorate of the big member states’ in 
the EU. Further, let us note that the declarations of Prime Minister Juncker during the 
campaign also fuelled some discussions within and outside Luxembourg. First, in January, he 
was the main guest of the 29th Conference of Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen in Dortmund. In his 
introduction, the co-chairman of the German green party Cem Özdemir, declared that the 
invitation of a Christian Democrat statesman (for the first time) to speak at their convention 
was due to the fact that they shared with him a vision that all political parties were invited to 
share to make the European project more attractive for all citizens. The acceptance of such an 
invitation was however diversely appreciated among the European People’s Party and 
especially the German Christian Democratic ranks (in the Grand Duchy, several parties 
invited well-known figures from neighbouring countries but belonging to their European 
party, such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit for Déi Gréng, Martin Schulz for the LSAP or Alain 
Krivine for déi Lénk). Second, at the end of the electoral campaign Juncker declared that he 
would no longer keep the Ministry of Finance in the next government, leaving it to Luc 
Frieden, at that time Minister of Justice and Budget. This brought into question his 
chairmanship of the Eurogroup, which he chaired since 2005 and was expected to chair until 
December 2010. Finally, in the last months of the legislative term, when the campaign 
intensified, controversies became more personalized: candidate MEP Goebbels of the LSAP 
criticized EU Commissioner Reding (CSV) for starting her EP elections campaign whilst still 
in place as Commissioner.  
 
9.3. The  results of the 2009 European Elections 
 
 
-Table 8.2.: National elections in Luxembourg 1979-2009 JUST ABOUT HERE- 
 
-Table 8.3.: European elections Luxembourg, 1979-2009 JUST ABOUT HERE- 
 
-Table 8.4.: differences between national and European elections 1979-2009* JUST 
ABOUT HERE- 
 
The CSV lost nearly 6 percent points of the votes in the EP elections while at the same time 
reaching one of its top historic records at the national elections. This loss was mainly due to 
the absence of Prime Minister Juncker and other heavyweights on the European list. However, 
the party managed to keep its three MEPs. Three other parties gained one seat, as in 2004. 
The LSAP did so despite a loss of support: like its coalition government partner, it scored its 
worst result since 1979 (being for the first time below the 20% level), whilst the DP gained 
votes (contrary to its result in the national elections) thanks to its popular frontrunner 
Goerens,37 and the Greens were also on the rise. The DP returned to the third position in the 
hierarchy of parties in European elections, which it had lost to the Greens in 2004. Regardless 
of this change in ranking, the Greens have continued their impressive progression at the 
European competition: from 6.1 percent in 1984 to 16.8 percent in 2009. Compared to 2004 
the Greens gained almost 2 percent points of support, largely due to its increase in personal 
votes, going mainly to their incumbent MEP Claude Turmes.  
As was the case since 1979, none of the more Eurosceptic parties won a single seat. The ADR 
obtained 7.4 percent (0.6 percent less than in 2004) while the two radical left parties gained 
votes, reaching overall about 5 percent. The newly created Biergerlëscht came close to the 
KPL, reaching 1.4 percent of the votes. As can be seen in Table 8.4., for the first time since 
the first direct election of the EP, the differences between the national scores and European 
scores were higher than 3 points of percent for three parties. Prior to 2009, this phenomenon 
had only occurred for one party at a time, in 2004 for the Greens and in 1979 for the Liberals. 
At the 2009 election, the highest difference ever recorded was the CSV’s, with a 6.7 points of  
percent less at the European elections than at the national ones, followed by the Greens with a 
5.1 points of percent gap in favour of their score at the EP election, and the Liberals with a 
European score 3.7 points of percent higher than their result at the general elections.  
 
From the viewpoint of the personal electoral scores, we note that foreign candidates were the 
weakest candidates in all the electoral lists, with the exception of one foreign candidate of déi 
Lénk who arrived third out of six. It is however likely that the number of foreign candidates 
and their popularity will grow with the increase of EU residents registering to become voters. 
The leader of the CSV list, the EU Commissioner Viviane Reding, was elected but took back 
her seat in the Commission (and was proposed for a third term in the Commission by the 
government formed in July) and was therefore replaced by Georges Bach, a male candidate 
with no prior political experience. It was the first time since 1979 that the majority of elected 
MEPs effectively took their seat. Five out of six of the elected MEPs had some prior EU 
position experience, four as MEPs and one as Commissioner, and two of these candidates 
elected were women. Among the seating MEPs we however count only four with a prior EU-
level experience and only one woman. The average age of the Luxembourg EP delegation is 
45.5 years, the youngest being 34 years and the oldest being 80 years, both belonging to the 
CSV.  
 
10.Theoretical Interpretation of Euroelections  
 
10.1. Second Order election theory 
 
 
With its compulsory voting system and simultaneous EP and national elections, Luxembourg 
is clearly a special case when it comes to testing classical hypotheses of the second order 
theory. The question of turnout effect is bound not to materialize with participation rates 
generally oscillating around 90 percent for both national and European elections. Table 8.5 
shows that in 2009, 90.8 percent of the 240,673 registered voters actually went to the polls. 
Since 1979 we only find marginal variations between national and EP elections, but these 
differences however point in different directions, indicating for 2004 and 2009 a higher 
turnout for national elections in line with the prediction of the second-order election 
hypothesis, whilst participation differentials in 1994 and 1999 appeared to contradict this 
prediction. Rather than suggesting a decrease of interest through time in EP elections in 
comparison with national ones, these variations are due to the introduction of voting rights for 
EU residents and the consequent changes in the composition of the voting population. First, 
the very small proportions of foreigners in the EP electorate in 1994 and 1999 were highly 
motivated voters who registered despite strict conditions and weak campaigns of 
mobilization. These were therefore less likely to defect at the polls, making the EP 
participation rate better than the one of the national elections. On the other hand, as the 
proportions of foreigners grew due to greater mobilization campaigns and looser conditions, 
registration became easier and may have led some less motivated residents to register without 
appropriately evaluating the consequences of such an act in a compulsory voting system. 
Hence, the greater proportions of EU residents voting at the EP elections in the 2004 and 2009 
may explain this reversal of dynamics in terms of turnout.38 Finally, notice that both null 
(partly due to a lack of experience of EU residents with Luxembourg’s peculiar electoral 
system) and blank votes are systematically higher in EP elections than in national ones. For 
the latter, the differential is about 2 points of percent, as blank votes usually account for more 
than 5 percent of the ballots cast in EP elections, and about 3 percent in the national electoral 
contest. This higher use of blank votes for EP elections could reflect voters’ lower interest –in 
line with the second-order hypothesis– for these elections in the context of a compulsory 
voting system. Finally, let us point that in 2009, rates of non participation, of blank and of 
null votes increased in comparison with the 2004 figures. The decision to ban double 
candidatures may explain this result, as some voters who could have voted for national figures 
with a high profile in the single constituency of the EP election were deprived from this 
opportunity. Hence, ironically, this decision that was intended to make EP elections less 
dependent on the domestic politics offer and therefore more clearly ‘European’, may have 
made them more ‘second-order’ as measured by the classical turnout differential indicator of 
this theory. 
 
According to the second-order theory, larger and governmental parties should lose at 
European elections in comparison to their previous national score. In Luxembourg, we have to 
compare whether voters punish governmental parties more at EP elections than in national 
elections, as compared to their preceding national result. Out of seven pairs of such 
differences we can see that governmental losses were greater at national elections than at EP 
elections on four occasions, that the differences were almost equal on two occasions, and that 
only in 2009 did the second-order hypothesis operationalized in the classical way, without 
adapting to the case of simultaneous elections, was verified, with greater losses of 
governmental parties at EP elections. The losses of governmental parties recorded at EP 
elections in Luxembourg therefore mainly reflect, albeit in a smoothed way, the increasing 
lack of popularity of incumbents (from national elections to national elections) documented 
for the post-war period by Narud and Valen (2009). This is the empirical confirmation of the 
logical consequence of holding both elections at the same time in Luxembourg: EP elections 
are not perceived as an instrument for sanctioning the governmental parties on national issues, 
as voters may punish incumbents at the ‘first-order’ election.39  
 
Some lessons may nevertheless also be drawn by looking at the differences between the 
results of the concurrent national and EP elections. Due to the simultaneity of elections, these 
generally match, as indicated in Table 8.4, with the positive or negative evolution of party 
scores at the national elections also reflected at the EP election. Most likely due to the 
agreement of the main parties not to present the same candidates to the national and European 
elections and the electoral system reform that further increased recourse to preferential votes, 
in 2009 the evolution of the scores for the party of the PM and that of the main opposition 
party however clearly diverged at both levels, with the first losing heavily and the second 
gaining at the EP election, leading to what could be perceived, albeit too rapidly, as a proof of 
an increasing “second-order” reflex in Luxembourg.40 In addition to some degree of EU 
voting (see below), the absence of the popular figure of the Prime minister on the EP list 
largely accounts for the poor performance of the CSV in 2009. The DP on the other hand 
largely won because of the primer given to national popular figures leading their lists in the 
single constituency. Finally, although the Greens have constantly fared better in the EP 
compared to national elections, smaller parties generally do not do better at the EP elections 
than at the national level, and this has been once more confirmed in 2009.41 The limited 
number of MEPs to be elected probably explains a certain degree of strategic voting 
behaviour, voters preferring to support parties or candidates that have a chance to gain a seat 
at the European parliament.  
 
10.2. Europe Salience Theory 
 
Ever since 1979, the simultaneity of elections has made EP election campaigns less visible 
than national ones. Political parties have only on a minority of occasions drafted separate 
manifestos for the EP elections. References to the manifestos of the European political parties 
generally do not abound, even though on some occasions in the early days of direct elections 
of the EP the section devoted to ‘Europe’ in the general electoral programme was simply 
copied from that of the European party. As Luxembourg is one of the European capitals and 
that its political personnel has provided for important figures of European parties, some 
general meetings of the latter were organized in the Grand Duchy. A tendency to refer to a 
‘regional’ dimension, evidenced by the politicization of some policy issues and the invitation 
of leading party figures of neighbouring parties to meetings in the campaign appears to have 
generalized. Debates over EU issues are also often influenced by events or positions taken by 
German, French or Belgian political actors. This often takes a negative tone, as 
Luxembourguish political elites have come increasingly concerned about its vulnerability and 
the fate of small member states in the EU. Its small size also accounts for a certain lack of 
distinctive Luxembourguish positions on some EU issues as the Grand Duchy only has a few 
national interests, such as the European seat and the preservation of its competitive banking 
system. Added to the overall lack of a clear cleavage on positions over EU integration in a 
population still displaying a high level of utilitarian support and a lower interest in EP 
elections than for the concurrent national electoral contest, these factors contribute to the 
dominance of domestic issues in European election party campaigns and media coverage.  
 
Different trends, that may at first seem antagonistic, are however noticeable. On the one hand, 
in EP campaigns parties increasingly stress the linkage between the stakes of national and 
European elections, and thereby reinforce the tendency of domestic issues to prevail. On the 
other hand, the 2009 elections have changed a number of parameters. For the first time 
candidates competing for the EP elections were, aside from the frontrunners, generally 
unknown and/or unexperienced. And yet, the 2009 campaign was more visible and 
competitive. The media also reflected what was probably in part generated by the ban of 
double candidatures, that is a clearer distinction between domestic issues handled by national 
actors and EU issues dealt with by EU actors. Several factors may account for this “light” 
europeanization of the campaign that may in turn have slightly increased the saliency of EU 
issues in vote choice at the EP elections: first, a greater awareness and interest of EU issues 
may have grown in the population out of the referendum campaign of 2005; second, the main 
theme of both national and European elections, the international financial and economic 
crisis, was transnational in essence; third, in their quest for responsibilities for the spill-over 
of this originally US crisis on the European continent, the large EU member states pointed at 
the role of tax havens, thereby raising concerns over the greatest matter of national interest in 
the Grand Duchy; fourth, the campaign strategies of the frontrunners of major parties in 
general, and of some other candidates who issued separate, personal manifestos over EU 
issues increased the saliency and interest around the European campaign. The latter was 
certainly enhanced by the previously mentioned changes of electoral rules and practices, and 
probably accounts for why Luxembourg voters declared to have been much more informed 
about the EU campaign in 2009 than they did during the preceding elections.   
 
Some studies have shown that Luxembourg displayed a comparatively low level of 
congruence between the positions of voters and the parties they vote for in EP elections and 
even for 2009 de Vries et al. (2011: 23-26) did not find significant EU issue voting in 
Luxembourg.42 A certain level of “sincere vote” on EU positions however appeared to 
materialize in the recent elections, especially noticeable it the vote switching behaviour of the 
voters of the largest party and the Greens. CSV voters in national elections are much less 
enthusiastic about European integration that what they perceive the party to stand for, thereby 
leading some of them in 2004 and 2009 to switch to another party closer to their positions on 
Europe for the EP elections (see Dumont et al. 2006; 2011).43 This degree of EU issue voting 
is however probably cancelled by the fact that despite some potential support in the 
population for less Europhile positions, the more Eurosceptic parties in Luxembourg’s 
political landscape, continue to fare very modestly in EP elections. 
 
11. Conclusions 
 
The specific and evolving institutional context of Luxembourg’s EP elections, that are fought 
concurrently with national ones, and which voting is compulsory, make for prudent 
conclusions over the validity of the traditional second-order theory and that of European 
saliency in this case. We recorded some patterns and trends, but also a variety of different and 
sometimes countervailing influences, the combined effect of which, as already suggested by 
van der Eijk and Schmitt (1996), may be as dependent on the idiosyncracies of the successive 
peculiar situations as on the structural features and merits of these respective theories. For 
instance, whereas the changes in the 2009 EP election institutional context and political offer 
were intended as a first modest, but important, political step for affirming the identity and 
specificity of the European elections, they also led to results that at first sight better match the 
expectations of second order theory. However, at the micro level, the motivations for 
expressing a different vote than the one for the national elections were not, as suggested by 
the second order theory, the willingness to express a sincere vote and/or to sanction the 
governmental parties on national matters. Those who voted differently at both elections did so 
essentially because they lacked the national heavyweights they used to have on their EP 
ballot, others did so in part because of their preferences over European issues, whilst others 
still strategically switched to a party that, contrary to the one voted for at the national 
elections, had a chance to win an MEP seat. In such conditions, the addition of occurrences of 
EP elections and potential further institutional changes may not help us much in drawing 
firmer conclusions on the respective merits of existing hypotheses that have developed from 
theoretical premises (and empirical contexts) that hardly apply to (resemble) the case of the 
Grand Duchy.  
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Table 8.1.Country Profile Luxembourg  JUST ABOUT HERE- 
  
EC Entry year  1957 (founding member)
MEPs elected at 2009 
Euroelections 
6  
MEPs after the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty  
6  
Capital  Luxembourg 
Population  493,500 (43.7% of foreigners) in Dec 
2008; 502,100 (43.1% of foreigners) in 
Dec 2009 …
Ethnic Minorities (Please 
specify percentages)  
43.7 (or 43.1 in Dec 2009) percent 
foreign population: Portuguese (37 
percent), French (13 percent), Italians (9 
percent), Belgians (8 percent)  and 
Germans (5.5 percent) 
Population density 190.8 per km² (Dec 2008) 
Political system  Constitutional monarchy
Head of State Grand Duke Henri
 Head of Government  Jean Claude Juncker (CSV)
Political Majority  Coalition between Christian Democrats 
(CSV) and Socialists (LSAP)  
Currency Euro 
Prohead GDP 75 700 euros (Eurostat, 2009 figure)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.2.: National elections in Luxembourg 1979-2009 
 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
CSV 36.39 36.65 32.42 30.31 30.09 36.13 38.04 
LSAP  22.51 31.79 26.21 25.39 22.29 23.37 21.56 
DP 21.88 20.36 17.19 19.28 22.35 16.06 14.99 
déi gréng  4.22 8.56 9.91 9.08 11.58 11.72 
ADR   7.92 9.03 11.31 9.95 8.14 
KPL 4.86 4.38 4.4 2.35 - 0.91 1.47 
déi Lénk     3.30 1.87 3.28 
BL       0.81 
SDP 6.38       
Others 7.98 2.59 3.27 3.72 1.58 0.12  
Source: successive election reports (CRISP 1979-1994; ELECT, University of Luxembourg, 
1999-2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.3.: European elections Luxembourg, 1979-2009 
  
 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
CSV 36.13 34.9 34.87 31.5 31.67 37.13 31.36 
LSAP  21.65 29.93 25.45 24.8 23.58 22.09 19.48 
DP 28.13 22.07 19.95 18.83 20.46 14.87 18.66 
déi gréng  6.08 10.46 10.93 10.70 15.02 16.83 
ADR    6.95 8.99 8.03 7.39 
KPL 5.01 4.08 4.71 1.63 - 1.17 1.54 
déi Lénk     2.77 1.69 3.37 
BL    1.38 
SDP 7.00       
Others 2.08 2.94 4.56 4.43 1.83 0 0 
Source: successive election reports (CRISP 1979-1994; ELECT, University of Luxembourg, 
1999-2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.4.: differences between national and European elections 1979-2009* 
  1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
CSV -0.26 -1.75 +2.45 +1.19 +1.58 +1 -6.68 
LSAP  -0.86 -1.86 -0.76 -0.59 +1.29 -1.28 -2.08 
DP +6.25 +1.71 +2.76 -0.45 -1.89 -1.19 +3.67 
déi gréng / +1.86 +1.9 +1.02 +1.62 +3.44 +5.11 
ADR / / / -2.08 -2.32 -1.92 -0.75 
KPL +0.15 -0.3 +0.31 -0.72 / +0.26 +0.07 
déi Lénk / / / / / -0.18 +0.09 
BL / / / / / / +0.57 
* A positive (negative) figure indicates that the party’s result at the EP election was better (worse) than the result 
at the national election held simultaneously. Bold figures indicate differences greater than 3 % points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.5.: Rate of non participation at the national and European elections 1979-2009 
 Non participation to 
European elections 
Non participation to 
national elections 
Difference 
1979 10.7 10.7 0 
1984 11.2 11.2 0 
1989 12.6 12.6 0 
1994 13 13.3 -0.3
1999 12.7 13.5 -0.8
2004 8.6 8 +0.6
2009 9.2 9.1 +0.1
Source: successive election reports (CRISP 1979-1994; ELECT, University of Luxembourg, 
1999-2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.6. Usage of campaigning instruments (in percent) at the 2009 elections 
  EU Elections National Elections Difference 
Flyers 56.6 88.4 -31.8
Facebook 8.5 23 -14.5
meet in 
market/street 8.2 36 -27.8 
Newsletter 7.7 34.2 -26.5 
Public meetings 5.8 27 -21.2 
Email 3.5 17.8 -14.3
Work 1.5 10 -8.5
Home 0.5 4.8 -4.3
Phone 0.1 1.5 -1.4
Sms 0.1 2.6 -2.5
 
Source: ELECT 2009 post-electoral survey, (N=1,267) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.7.: Sources of information in European elections in 2004 and 2009 
 
 European election 
2009 
European election 
2004 
Difference 
Press 70.5% 59.8% +10.7% 
Discussion  67.2% 62.3% +4.9% 
Television 66% 49.8% +16.2% 
Radio 52.6% / /
Internet 21% 7% +14% 
Meetings 11% 3.5% +7.5% 
VAA (EU-profiler) 10.5% / /
 
Source: ELECT 2004 and 2009 post-electoral surveys, (N respectively = 1,335 and 1,267) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.8.MEPs profile from Luxembourg  
Name Political 
affiliati
on 
mandates 
before 
2009 
Professional 
background 
Birth S
ex 
Allocation of 
committee chairs  
Astrid 
Lulling  
CSV/EP
P 
5 
 
- Secretary and editor at 
the Lëtzebuerger 
Arbechter-Verband , the 
socialist trade union 
which became the 
OGB-L (1949-1963). 
Worked at the miners' 
and metalworkers' 
ECSC liaison office, 
Luxembourg (1950-
1958). 
- Member of the LSAP 
until 1969, for which 
she was MEP, then 
national MP for the 
LSAP’s splinter SDP   
1929 F - Quaestor 
 
Member of :  
- Committee on 
Economic and 
Monetary Affairs  
- Committee on 
Women's Rights and 
Gender Equality  
Georges 
Bach  
CSV/EP
P 
0 - Steel industry 
employee (1973-1974), 
then railwayman at 
Luxembourg Railways 
(SNCFL). 
- Head of SYPROLUX 
Christian trade union 
(railways and 
transports) since 2003. 
 
1955 M Member of :  
- Committee on 
Transport and 
Tourism 
Frank 
Engel 
CSV/EP
P 
0 - Secretary of the CSV 
parliamentary group in 
the Chamber of 
Deputies
1975 M Member of:  
- Committee on the 
Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection 
Robert 
Goebbe
ls 
LSAP/S
&D 
2 - Journalist for the 
Tageblatt (socialist 
newspaper) in the 1970s 
- Party executive 
functions, national MP, 
junior minister and 
minister since then    
  
1944 M Member of : 
- Committee on 
Industry, Research 
and Energy   
- Special Committee 
on the Financial, 
Economic and Social 
Crisis  
Claude 
Turmes  
déi 
Gréng/G
roup of 
the 
greens 
and 
Europea
n free 
alliance 
2 Physical education 
and sports teacher 
(1986-1999). Yoga 
instructor (1999). 
1960 M - Vice Chair of the 
Group of the 
Greens/European 
Free Alliance  
 
Member of:  
- Committee on 
Industry, Research 
and Energy 
Sources: candidates and parties’ webpages and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ accessed 5 
March, 2009 
                                                 
 
ENDNOTES  
 
 
1 ) In January 2009, a law on Luxembourgish nationality allowing for dual nationality came into force and made 
the number of “new nationals” per year increase by at least four compared to the 2005-2008 figures (see Dumont 
et al. 2010 and http://www.statistiques.public.lu/). The proportion of foreign population reached a high of 43.7% 
in December 2008 but stagnated at a slightly lower level (still above 43%) since the introduction of this law.  
2 ) Still under Dutch control due to its status as a German confederation fortress. 
3) From a military perspective of Luxembourg’ power has limited strength of approximately 450 professional 
soldiers – about 340 enlisted recruits and 100 civilians – and a total budget of $369 million. 
4 ) It consists of twenty-one members appointed for fifteen years, seven directly by the Grand Duke and the 
remaining fourteen on the recommendation of the Council itself or of the Chamber of Deputies. 
5 ) It stands between (and contains factions advocating more) liberal and interventionist views of the role of the 
state in the economy, with slight variations to the centre right according to the dominant internal faction of the 
day and the identity of its coalition partners. 
6 ) In 1937, an international context –virtually next door– in turmoil led the conservative wing of the party to 
propose a referendum on a law permitting the government to limit trade union action and to ban organisations 
such as the Communist Party. This united the ‘left’ front and led to rejection of the bill project by the population, 
paving the way for a change of the leadership allowing for the entry of the Socialist Party in cabinet.  
7 ) About one third of the municipalities (the larger ones) elect their representatives on party lists with a PR 
system (see Dumont et al. 2010). 
8 ) The KPL supported the Left lists in 1999 but the two radical left tendencies split again and fought elections 
separately in 2004 and 2009.   
9 ) Following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty awarding all EU citizens voting and eligibility rights for 
local elections in member states, Luxembourg’s government managed to insert a derogation in the European 
directive (EC 94/80) of December 1994, allowing for the imposition of conditions on the duration of residence 
for states with a proportion of population from other EU states higher than 20 per cent. The Grand Duchy was 
the sole country to apply it.  
10 ) A gap that further grew in 2009 (Dumont et al. 2011). 
11 ) Counting also  parties that were not represented in parliament, the proportion of votes received in 2004 by 
parties that were to oppose the EU Treaty (the radical left parties and the sovereignist ADR) was roughly 12 
percent. For a complete study of the referendum on the constitutional treaty in Luxembourg see Dumont et al. 
2007. 
12 ) He was actually reaffirming a position he had already made public at the time of the decision (2003) to hold a 
referendum on the issue. 
13 ) This number is constitutionally fixed since 1989. Before 1989, the number of seats in each constituency was 
linked to total population figures. 
14 ) Electoral studies since the 1970s show that parties that used to be of a “cadre” type and still present well-
known politicians, such as the Liberals, usually benefit from inter-party panachage, whereas those traditionally 
relying on a well-defined ideology and newer parties (such as the radical left parties and the sovereignist ADR) 
have more disciplined electorates expressing list votes.  
15 ) A custom that developed in the Grand Duchy regarding the formation of coalition government is that the 
largest party chooses the party (for long this choice was only between the liberals and the socialists, nowadays 
the Greens are also considered as ‘coalitionable’) that increased its result at the elections, provided that these two 
could form a majority coalition, as coalition partner (see Dumont and De Winter 2000). In 2009 none of the 
other parties (opposition or junior party of the coalition) gained seats – the Greens kept their 7 seats out of 60, 
the Liberals lost one and therefore only garnered 9 MPs, whilst the incumbent junior party also lost one seat but 
remained safely the second largest party of the country with 13 seats. The ADR was never considered as having 
a coalition potential by the other parties and lost one seat as well, and could not form a genuine parliamentary 
group (it is known as a ‘political tendency’ instead, with less rights than proper groups) at the Chamber for being 
short of five MPs. Note that after having lost its only MP in 2004 the radical left managed to be represented 
again in 2009. 
16 ) According to Hirsch (1985: 140), the limitation of preferential votes to one per candidate for the EP election 
owed to a compromise between the LSAP wishing to reduce the impact of inter-party panachage – which was 
traditionally detrimental to the results of this party – and the CSV seeking to prevent the candidates of the 
densely populated regions – basically the two largest constituencies for the national elections, in which this party 
was comparatively less powerful – from swamping the others because of the single constituency in use for the 
European electoral contest.   
                                                                                                                                                        
17 ) Registered voters aged over 75 are not obliged to vote (the age limit was 70 before a 2003 electoral law 
reform). 
18 ) And actually left his vice-PMship in late 1980 to become President of the European Commission.  
19 ) The LSAP also suffered from the CSV’s campaign against the threatening weight of the socialists which the 
leading opposition party felt in the coalition government’s policy and in the ambitions of the socialist trade union 
in unifying the labour movement and the .   
20 ) Debates regarding the presence of heavyweights on both lists, the simultaneity of elections and the use by the 
three main parties of the European funds (going to parties with incumbent MEPs) supposed to help them inform 
the population on European issues also animated somehow what was supposed to be the actual EP campaign.   21 ) This issue was also present in the 1979 campaign, with PM Thorn envisaging expensive investments in order 
to keep the EP in Luxembourg. This led to massive public protest and accusations of over-ambition on the part 
of the PM. 
22 ) A couple of scandals in national politics, one involving a CSV minister and the other the president of the 
national court of accounts, also embarrassed to some extent the incumbent coalition.  23) This section draws on Patrick Dumont and Astrid Spreitzer (2010)   
24) This was also the case for Frank Engel on the CSV list who was also elected MEP in 2009 
(http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2009/06/frank-engel/index.html, accessed March 7, 2012). René 
Kollwelter, member of the Council of State, on the LSAP list, who eventually was not elected 
(http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/actualites/2009/03/livre-rene-kollwelter/index.html, accessed March 7, 
2012) also published an essay.  
25 )°A majority of ADR candidates were also running in 2004, for only one candidate out of six for the DP and 
the BiergerLëscht (the leader of the latter list ran under the ADR banner in 2004). 
26 ) The main leaders were the incumbent MEPs Claude Turmes for the Greens and Robert Goebbels for the 
socialists. The CSV presented its European commissioner Viviane Reding and incumbent MEP Astrid Lulling, 
whilst a former MEP and minister, the incumbent president of national parliamentary group (and member of the 
committee in charge with European affairs) Charles Goerens, was leading the list of the Liberals. 
27 ) No less than one out of ten EP candidates turned out to be students. 
28 ) For a detailed analysis of the participation of foreigner candidates and voters at the 2009 EP elections see 
Besch et al. (2009).  
29 ) The data analyzed in this section are based on the post-electoral survey realized for the report ELECT 2009 
commissioned by the Luxembourgish national parliament (Dumont et al., 2011).  Note that the survey concerns 
only national citizens entitled to vote.  
30 ) The interest for both electoral campaigns is correlated with age, rising continuously from 41.9 percent for the 
25-34 years old to 63.1 percent for the over 65 years. Notice however that the very young voter (18-24 years) 
expresses a high interest for the EU elections (52 percent), probably related to the fact that these are their first 
electoral experience and that it takes place at the same time as the national ones. (Dumont et al., 2011). 
31 ) As in all other member states, a multimedia « choice box » was installed for about a month in Luxembourg 
town centre in order to let citizens record their questions through video messages, and there were posters at bus 
stops and on busses raising themes discussed in European arenas likely to affect the everyday lives of European 
citizens. The most well-known sports champions of the country, cyclists Andy and Frank Schleck, also 
participated to a European-wide video campaign visible on internet encouraging young citizens to go to vote for 
European elections. 
32 ) Nevertheless, by European standards, Luxembourg ranks comparatively low regarding EU issues visibility, 
especially when it comes to television broadcasts (only Wallonia and Czech Republic fare worse; see Schuck et 
al. 2011: 46). 
33 ) http://news.rtl.lu/news/international/17190.html and http://news.rtl.lu/news/international/17144.html, both 
accessed March 7, 2012. 
34 ) The candidates on Facebook are primarily in the LSAP and CSV for which five candidates out of six had a 
profile, followed by the Greens and Liberals (four candidates each) and ADR and the Left (three candidates 
each). Finally the KPL and the BL had only one candidate on Facebook. 
35 ) This concern was all the more strong that as a consequence of the financial and economic crisis, the financial 
sector lost 15 percent of its employment in 2009.  
36 ) The German Socialists’ party president (Franz Müntefering) declared that the closing down of tax havens 
was not rapid enough and that ‘in former times we [Germans, authors’ note] would have sent our troops there. 
But today that is impossible’; German Socialist Finance Minister (Peer Steinbrück) compared Luxembourg’s 
financial transparency (and that of the other small countries that still rely on banking secrecy) to that of Burkina-
Faso. Much less shocking criticisms also came from various French political camps. 
37 ) With 99,081 votes, he received the largest amount of preferential votes ever recorded (voters may now give 
up to 2 votes to the same candidate but even Juncker’s personal result of 2004 multiplied by 2 would have not 
                                                                                                                                                        
equalled this score), overtaking the CSV EU Commissioner Reding (71,410) the outgoing Green MEP Claude 
Turmes (60,645), who scored more than the other outgoing MEP, LSAP’s frontrunner Robert Goebbels. 
38 ) Some nationals may also have decided to abstain for the European elections whilst still voting at the national 
ones. This should however only concern a very small proportion since elections are simultaneously held and 
there are other ways to express lack of interest (blank or null votes) than abstaining cast a vote whilst in the 
polling booth. 
39 ) Hix and Marsh (2011) even remove Luxembourg from their calculations because since second-order theory 
actually assumes that both elections are not held at the same time, thereby encouraging different electoral 
behaviours at the micro-level. 
40 In 1989 the results also corresponded to a large extent to the expectation of the second order thesis, with also 
clear losses for both governmental parties losing votes in EP elections as compared to the preceding national 
ones. However we could see that the party of the PM lost even more at the national election. The cabinet parties’ 
losses at the EP election were partly due to the electoral breakthrough of the Greens who reached the 10% bar 
for their second EP contest and those at the national ones were due to the combination of the Greens’ results and 
those of the ADR who ran for the first time and only for the election of the Chamber of Deputies. On the other 
hand, we could also see that the Liberals who were the leading opposition party did worse at the 1989 EP 
election than at the 1984 national one (a better result however than the one for the national elections). This 
example further shows the difficulty of observing results clearly in line with the second order theory in a country 
that holds simultaneous elections at both levels. 
41 ) Conversely, big parties do not always lose as was already shown by Reif who had found that Luxembourg 
was the exception (1985: 27) on the ten EP contests of 1979 when aggregating the differences between the 
European and national results of the three largest parties. This unexpected result was however at the time only 
due to the success of the DP at the EP election, as the two others actually received less votes at the European 
elections than at the national ones. 
42 Due to the high distances between voter preferences and party preferences on the European integration 
question, and to the overall low rate of switchers (indicating that only about one voter out of five decided to vote 
for another party at the EP election, in part because of incongruence on EU issues with the party voted for at 
national elections), Luxembourg is even one of the few member states where the coefficient for EU issue voter-
party distance, which should be negative according to the EU issue voting version of the policy proximity 
hypothesis, is actually positive. 
43 ) In 2004 these voters switched mainly to the Greens but these losses were compensated by gains from voters 
from other parties, among which the sovereignist ADR, whilst in 2009 they overwhelmingly switched to both the 
Liberals and Greens in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
